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  In services markets, there may be legitimate reasons to regulate.   
Integration efforts should target regulatory restrictions that explicitly limit 
competition, and those that are intended to meet legitimate objectives, 
but are clearly more burdensome than need to be.  In health and maritime, 
ASEAN is already relatively liberal by international standards, although there 
is still scope to promote cross-border trade and ease costly cabotage         
restrictions.  In telecommunications, the residual foreign equity limits are 
hard to understand, given that past  reforms and current technologies have 
ensured that most markets are already relatively competitive.  In finance, 
there is substantially more to do, despite progress made during the Asian 
financial crisis.  And in air transport, despite commitments to open skies, 
there is a need to further align the content  of  bilateral  air  services        
agreements with regional integration  objectives. 
 
1. Defining integration in services 
 
  The key objective of ASEAN economic integration is to improve the competitiveness of 
the ASEAN economies so they can maintain their position as desirable destinations for foreign 
direct investment, as vital players in regional production networks, and as major trading entities 
in their own right.  The key to ASEAN improving its competitiveness is to improve its productivity. 
  Competition  can  be  a  powerful  force  for  generating  productivity  improvements.            
It  exerts pressure on producers to find the least cost way of serving customer needs, and to       
innovate in order to better serve those needs.  Competition sets in train a dynamic process that 
leads to prices reflecting production costs, and costs being as low as possible. 
  In services, foreign competition can play an important part, but it is not enough.                 
Competition from domestic new entrants is arguably even more important.  A recent study 
examined the empirical evidence on the relative importance of discriminatory barriers to     
foreign competition in services, and non-discriminatory barriers to any new competition, 
among a group of East Asian economies.  The exercise combined econometric evidence on 
the first round impacts of regulatory restrictions in seven selected services sectors (McGuire and 
Schuele 2000; Kalirajan et al. 2000; Kalirajan 2000; Clark, Dollar and Micco 2004; Nguyen-Hong 
2000; Warren 2000; Doove et al. 2001) with computable general equilibrium modelling of the 
flow-on effects (Dee 2007).  The results were striking.  The gains to the region from unilaterally 
reforming the non-discriminatory  restrictions on  competition were almost six times those from 
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2. Integration is not the same as               
 deregulation 
 
  In many services sectors, there are legitimate 
reasons  for  domestic  regulation.  For  example,          
prudential  regulation  is  required  in  banking  and        
insurance markets to guard against systemic instability 
of  the  financial  system.  Transport  industries  are        
regulated to ensure passenger safety. Access regimes 
in  telecommunications  are  intended  to  avoid  the          
inefficient duplication of infrastructure components 
that have ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics. And 
health markets are regulated to ensure quality and 
equitable access. 
  Attempts to promote market integration in       
services need to recognise the right of individual         
governments to regulate to meet these legitimate     
objectives.  Integration  efforts  should  first  target        
restrictions that explicitly limit competition in various 
ways.  They should also target  regulations  that  are    
intended to meet legitimate objectives, but are more   
burdensome than they need to be to meet those       
objectives. 
  Sometimes it can be very difficult to define what 
is ‘more burdensome than necessary’, especially since 
governments at different levels of development often 
make different judgements about which  legitimate 
objectives to pursue, and how hard to pursue them.  So 
typically, market integration efforts in services focus first 
on regulations that are primarily designed to restrict     
competition. 
 
3. Identifying pro and anti- competitive               
regulation 
 
           In some services, it is reasonable easy to           
separate those regulations that restrict competition 
from those designed to achieve legitimate objectives. 
            In  banking  and  insurance,  the  instruments     
commonly  used  for  prudential  purposes  include      
minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy       
ratios, liquidity reserve ratios, possible coverage by an       
insolvency guarantee or deposit insurance scheme, 
and  transparency  measures.    The  instruments           
commonly  used  to  restrict  competition  include         
licensing  restrictions on the entry of new domestic or 
foreign banks, equity limits that prescribe minimum   
domestic  or  government  involvement,  and  operating        
restrictions limiting the nature and scope of bank         
operations. 
           In  most  cases,  banking  and  insurance  services 
can be liberalized without jeopardizing prudential       
objectives, which are achieved using other means.  Of 
course, there is still a  sequencing issue — it would be 
unwise to open  financial markets  without adequate 
prudential regulation and without adequate regulatory 
capacity to design and enforce it. 
           Similarly  in  telecommunications,  there  is  a        
relatively clear-cut distinction between regulatory       
instruments designed to prevent the abuse of ‘natural 
monopoly’ power, and restrictions on competition. The 
WTO Reference Paper on  Telecommunications outlines 
the key elements of a pro-competitive regime. These 
include arrangements to ensure that competitors can 
get access to those components of the incumbent’s 
network that have natural monopoly characteristics, 
and  regulations to ensure  interconnectivity and         
number portability. Restrictions that unduly  impede 
competition include limited or heavily prescriptive     
licenses,  equity  limits,  and  failure  to  adopt  a                      
pro-competitive regulatory regime of the type just       
described. 
           In international air transport, bilateral air services 
agreements cover legitimate matters such as aviation   
security, incident investigation, immigration and control 
of travel documents.  But they often contain other,     
anti-competitive elements, such as limits on the number 
of airlines flying between countries, the ownership             
structure of those airlines, their capacity and pricing, 
and whether they can provide domestic as well as 
international services in the two countries.  Open skies 
agreements are designed to liberalise at least some of 
these anti-competitive elements. 
           Maritime services are similar to aviation   services 
in that there is scope for legitimate   regulation to       
ensure safety. But anti-competitive regulation is also 
common.  In particular, cabotage restrictions may   
require that shipping services  between  domestic ports 
in  a  country  be  carried  out  by  ships  that  are             
domestically owned, operated, built, and/or crewed.   
These  regulations  have  been  shown  to  be  costly,           
particularly to developing countries (Kang 2000). 
            In  health  services,  the  distinction  between       
instruments  used  to  achieve  quality  and  access       
objectives and those deemed to be anti-competitive is 
less    clear-cut.  Entry may be restricted to  ensure that 
low-quality providers do not enter the market.  Or entry may 
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Similarly, access to subsidies may be limited because               
governments cannot afford to subsidize everybody.  Or     
access to subsidies may be  limited in order to disadvantage 
new entrants. 
              Achieving  quality  objectives  in  health  will  inevitably 
mean that there are barriers to the entry and operation of at 
least some providers.  However, a well-designed quality     
control framework will ensure that the  providers who are 
locked out are the genuinely low-quality ones. The framework 
can afford to be  relatively neutral in its treatment of domestic 
and foreign providers, or incumbents and new entrants.     
Similarly, governments should be neutral in  providing subsidies 
to incumbents and new entrants, even if they are not neutral 
in their treatment of domestic and foreign customers. 
In other professional services markets, such as for     
accounting services, the problem of quality assurance is 
largely dealt with after the event, via mechanisms such as   
professional indemnity insurance.  These ex post controls on 
quality are reasonably easy to distinguish from barriers to   
entry.  Thus the targets/instruments problem does not extend 
to all professional  services. 
4.  ASEAN  progress  towards  integration         
of services markets 
 
  The extent of integration in ASEAN services       
markets has been assessed for medical, health and 
financial services (Dee 2009), maritime, air transport 
and telecommunications (Dee 2010). 
 In  health and medical services,  the  ASEAN    
region is already relatively liberal (see also       
Arunanondchai and Fink 2007).  In part, this is because 
ASEAN has centres of excellence in medical and 
healthcare.  Some ASEAN  countries have also bound 
relatively  liberal  regimes  as  part  of  their  WTO             
accession.  And many ASEAN  countries cannot yet 
afford the expensive universal healthcare subsidies 
available in the developed world, and so have not 
instituted the restrictions on access to subsidies that can 
also restrain trade. 
  To facilitate further progress in  liberalizing health 
and medical services, the ASEAN countries need to 
work together to establish satisfactory  regimes for     
regulating and  enforcing minimum acceptable quality        
standards, both for individual professionals and for 
healthcare  institutions.  This will be a key   prerequisite 
to dismantling the regulatory and other restrictions that, 
while having a possible rationale in quality  assurance, 
are either more discriminatory or more burdensome 
that    required. 
   Finance, along with telecommunications, is an 
area  where  services  trade  liberalization  has             
progressed most rapidly.  For example, these were the 
two  services areas where substantial  agreement was 
reached in the WTO at the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round.  In  other  parts  of  the  world,  liberalization          
of financial  services has continued since. 
    In ASEAN, the situation has been at least partly 
one of stasis, if not  backsliding.  Ironically, this can be  
attributed in part to the Asian financial crisis. In the 
wake of the crisis, many ASEAN countries undertook  
significant reform of their prudential regulation, and 
some loosened restrictions on foreign ownership on a 
most-favoured  nation  basis,  albeit  sometimes  only                
temporarily.  Even in trade circles, this created an 
impression that ‘everything that needs to be done, 
has been done’. Yet in banking in particular, a           
majority of ASEAN countries have yet to reach the 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint targets for   
foreign equity limits.  And barriers to trade   extend far 
beyond these limits, as the Blueprint itself  recognizes. 
 In  air services, only one ASEAN country meets 
the Blueprint target of allowing at least 70 per cent 
foreign ownership in domestically established air     
services companies by 2010.  However, effective   
liberalization of trade in air services not only requires 
the reform of investment laws, it also requires the     
reform  of  withholding  clauses  in  air  services          
agreements  so  that  at  minimum,  they  allow           
substantial ownership by an ASEAN  community of 
interests, rather than substantial domestic ownership. 
ASEAN  members  should  be  working  towards  further     
reform of their air services agreements, and should be 
demanding much greater  transparency of their       
provisions. 
    Most ASEAN countries have taken a relatively 
liberal approach to many aspects of maritime      
regulation.  But few have stated that they grant       
exemptions from cabotage restrictions.  ASEAN     
members should  be looking to expand the scope of 
these  exemptions, given how costly cabotage         
r e s t r i c t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  s h o w n  t o  b e  f o r   d e v e l o p i n g  
countries. No ASEAN country meets the Blueprint     
target  of  allowing  at  least  51  per  cent  foreign        
ownership by 2010 in all maritime services.  However, 
some countries meet it for some services. 
  Only two ASEAN countries currently meet  the 
Blueprint’s  foreign  equity  targets  in  all                          
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on foreign equity limits are hard to understand, given 
the extent of existing competition in most countries, 
even in fixed line services.  The persistence of very high 
market shares of incumbent service suppliers in a few 
ASEAN countries is  perhaps indicative of remaining   
problems with general regulation in those countries. 
5.Postscript — should integration efforts           
be preferential? 
 
       The  Blueprint  itself  only  suggests  preferential            
liberalization in the case of foreign equity limits. A 
broader focus on preferential liberalization would have 
several significant drawbacks. 
  If concessions were made to ASEAN trading     
partners, prior to removing non-discriminatory distortions 
and ensuring the general contestability of markets, 
then liberalisation would simply risk handing monopoly 
rents to those trading partners.  Furthermore, if the new 
trading partner had to incur sunk costs to enter the 
market,  then  a  country  would  risk  landing  itself         
permanently with a second class supplier who is difficult 
to budge (see also Dee and Findlay 2008, Marchetti 
and Roy 2008). 
  Second,  a  focus  on  granting  preferential         
concessions to particular foreign suppliers would be 
poor politics as well as poor economics.  It risks taking 
the  attention  away  from  measures  that  also              
affect domestic new entrants.  If these measures are 
not  attended  to,  then  ASEAN  economies  lose  the           
opportunity to expand their own domestic business 
base.  They also miss the opportunity to harness an     
important new set of domestic  pro-reform champions. 
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